in this report, showed a desire for an increase in consultant physicians by about 126 (12%) over the next two years. This is considerably more than the figure quoted by the DHSS in its guidelines of August 1984, in which a net increase of 27 posts a year was predicted for the next four years. The numbers of other supporting staff-hospital practitioners, associate specialists, and clinical assistants-were not inconsiderable, amounting to 557 sessions a week, the equivalent of 50 whole time physicians. One should question whether 4-7% of the total workforce (and this is probably an underestimate) should be so constituted while consultant expansion is constrained. Further information on the role of these grades, particularly in technique oriented specialties such as endoscopy is required.
in this report, showed a desire for an increase in consultant physicians by about 126 (12%) over the next two years. This is considerably more than the figure quoted by the DHSS in its guidelines of August 1984, in which a net increase of 27 posts a year was predicted for the next four years. The numbers of other supporting staff-hospital practitioners, associate specialists, and clinical assistants-were not inconsiderable, amounting to 557 sessions a week, the equivalent of 50 whole time physicians. One should question whether 4-7% of the total workforce (and this is probably an underestimate) should be so constituted while consultant expansion is constrained. Further information on the role of these grades, particularly in technique oriented specialties such as endoscopy is required.
What is the future for general medicine? Whatever the trends towards increasing specialisation the need to care for acute medical admissions, which account for an overwhelming proportion of the inpatient workload, will continue. Even if specialty transfer becomes more common in teaching hospitals logistics will make it impossible in all but the largest district hospital. The development of special interests is likely to continue at all grades, and to cover the wide range In 1976, apparently the standard procedure for grants was for NHMRC applications to be sent to several external assessors, either in Australia or overseas, who were experts in the applicant's subject. The assessors were expected to comment on the application and rate it by ticking one of six boxes graded 1 (poor) to 6 (outstanding). The application was assigned to a particular member of a relevant committee of the NHMRC. This member, called the spokesman, reported to the committee on his own personal rating as well as those of the external assessors. Then the other members of the committee wrote down their ratings, and the average of the ratings by the committee members was used to decide whether to offer a grant. Dr Smith sought documents through the freedom of information legislation on all these facets of the 1976, 1979, and 1982 grant applications.
The department of health initially provided copies of the reports submitted by the external assessors in each of the three years and by the interviewing committees responsible for the final grant recommendations. The ratings that went into these reports were deleted. Dr Smith requested an internal review of the decision to delete the ratings. This led to the release of the ratings of the 1976 and 1979 assessors. The ratings of the 1982 assessor were withheld on the grounds of "breach of confidentiality." Access to the final ratings of the 1976, 1979, and 1982 interviewing committees was also denied by the department ofhealth as being "contrary to the public interest" because "the disclosure of these ratings would prejudice the effectiveness of the 'peer review process' by which medical research funds are allocated."
This decision was not surprising as it is common for government departments to reveal as little as possible on sensitive issues in response to freedom of information requests. The standard response to this obstruction is to appeal against the department's refusal. In several cases departments have withdrawn their cases and supplied the requested documents just before the appeal was to be heard.5 In the Smith case an administrative appeals tribunal finally heard the case and ruled in favour of Dr Smith. This was a pivotal decision as it potentially opened up the federal grant giving process to much more scrutiny.
In Dr Smith's 1976 application there were two external assessors. One supported the project, giving it a rating of 5 (very good). The second assessor offered a variety of comments, both supportive and critical, and proposed providing support for a pilot project (funding for one or two years). This assessor did not include a numerical rating. By contrast, the spokeman's interview notes (a standard form) were almost uniformly negative. Most critically, the independent assessors' priority ratings are written down as "1 and 'not entered in a box'." The final committee rating was 1, the lowest possible.
It seems reasonable to infer that the spokesman misrepresented the assessors' reports to the committee. One assessor's rating was altered from 5 to 1, and the other became "not entered in a box" with no mention of the recommendation for a pilot project. The spokesman seems to have influenced the rest of the committee to give the project a rating of 1. Although it seems certain that an injustice was perpetrated, there is no way to prove bias. Nevertheless, it is worth spelling out some possible reasons for the spokesman's hostility to the project. Firstly, Dr Smith is a strong, confident, and outspoken woman scientist in a male dominated research area. As such, she is likely to be seen as a threat by some male scientists. Secondly, Dr Smith approached problems in her subject in quite a different fashion from the spokesman. Dr Smith used direct detailed observation with a small sample to analyse non-verbal processes, whereas the spokesman built his career on gathering data through questionnaires. Thus there may have been elements of a paradigms conflict between them.6 Finally, Dr Smith had a PhD, and the spokesman had an MD. Dr Smith had occasionally appeared at meetings of MD colleagues and disagreed with them. The PhD versus MD issue within the medical research community symbolises a number of differences that are often keenly felt.
In short, Dr Smith was an outspoken women with a PhD doing the wrong sort of research so far as the spokesman was concerned. This may explain his hostility. But 
Discussion
Grant giving bodies are important parts of the social system of science, but their operations are largely carried out in secret by elite members of the scientific community. The very limited available evidence suggests that various types ofbias occur in the allocation of grants. Informally, many scientists believe that they must "play it safe" in grant applications because of discrimination against unorthodox ideas and projects that might offend those with vested interests.
The referees of grant applications are usually leading figures in their subject; as such they are almost always exponents of the prevailing conceptual structures, methods, and orientations in their subject, or in other words representatives of the current paradigm.' Grant proposals that deal with what are considered to be unorthodox ideas, therefore, have a greatly reduced chance of success. Lynn Margulis, for example, describes her experience in applying for National Science Foundation grants concerning her work on a possible endosymbiotic origin for the microtubule system: I was told by an NSF [National Science Foundation] grants officer (after having been supported nicely for several years) that 'important' scientists did not like the theory presented in a book I had written and that they would never fund my work. I was actually told that I should never apply again to the cell biology group at NSF.7 Because it is widely recognised by scientists that unorthodox ideas have little chance of receiving funding, proposals are commonly self censored.
David Horrobin gives the classic account of a different source of bias in grant refereeing: ignorance and incompetence.8 Drawing from his own experience in applying for grants to study the action of prolactin in sheep and humans, he describes how some referees, including some "highly respected ones in top academic positions,"
were ignorant of current work on the subject and apparently had not fully read (or comprehended) the grant application. Many scientists have their own stories about incompetent referees' reports.
One explanation for the poor performance of some referees is that they are overworked and fail to keep up with what is happening in their subject. The leading people in many specialties are research administrators rather than research workers and so may be quite out of touch with research developments. The secrecy that shrouds most refereeing prevents accountability and enables some scientists to get by with shoddy efforts that would be an acute embarrassment if disclosed publicly.
There is substantial documentation ofthe role ofvested interestssuch as governments, large corporations, and professions-in suppressingresearch threatening to them-for example, by blocking appointments, smearing reputations, blocking promotions and publications, and sacking people.9 Preventing potential critics from gaining research grants is one such method of suppression. Because of the secrecy smothering most grant giving operations, the number of documented cases of suppression is small. Aside from the case of Dr Smith, there seem to be only two other published cases of alleged prejudice in awarding research grants in Australia.'01'
A well known case in the United States is that of Dr Thomas Mancuso, who received funding for many years from the United States Department of Energy to study the effects of low level ionising radiation on workers at the Hanford nuclear reprocessing plant in the state of Washington. The attack on Mancuso was stimulated by his refusal to issue a press release rebutting the finding by another researcher, who found an increased risk of cancer among Hanford workers. Mancuso refused because he had not finished his study. This action worried key people in the Department of Energy who were afraid that Mancuso might obtain and publicise similar results. Irwin Bross describes what happened next:
The DOE [Department of Energy] called in six reviewers to 'decide' whether or not to continue support for Dr Mancuso at the University of Pittsburg. Four of the six recommended that the support be continued, two reviews were unfavorable.... on January 8, 1976, a DOE staffer (who subsequently left for the private sector) produced a memo recommending termination of the Mancuso contract. The recommendation was actually carried out by a second DOE staffer who replaced him. As 'justification,' the DOE memo cited the two unfavorable reviews, only one of which had recommended termination (and transfer to another school of public health). The four favorable reviews were not mentioned.... the contract for the Hanford study that had been taken away from Dr Mancuso had been transferred to Battelle West, a private contractor. There, it was under the administrative control ofthe ex-DOE staffer who had written the termination memo. 12 Little of this information would ever have been revealed except for a congressional investigation and the use of the Freedom of Information Act.
The allegation that vested interests bias decisions about grants is a strong one and very difficult to prove. It is important to emphasise that subjective bias is not necessary. Most referees and research administrators are well meaning and convinced that they have the best reasons for their decisions. The 
